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- JUSTICE BRENNAN, THE CONSTITUTION, AND
MODERN AMERICAN LIBERALISM
David Rudenstine *
Societies experience periods of relative consensus and periods of
disunity. Years of consensus are marked by broad agreement on so
cial, economic, and political means and ends. During these times ide
ological debates are minimal; political discourse is primarily limited
to strategies and narrowly defined subjects. Periods of disunity are
characterized by substantial disagreements over political, social, and
economic means and ends. These periods are marked by ideological
conflicts; poUtical, economic, and social disputes are fundamental.
Compared to the 1950's, ours is a time of relative disunity. We
disagree over fundamental matters such as the class and race divisions
in our society, economic policy, and our role in world affairs. Our
disunity over basic political, social, and economic structures has
spilled over into the legal academy, and has stimulated a fresh and
intense interest among legal academics in legal theory.' As do their
counterparts in other disciplines, these contemporary legal theorists
disagree over basic issues.
Justice Brennan's Reason, Passion, and "The Progress of the
Law,"^ is related to two current debates on legal theory, which are
themselves intertwined. The first concerns the dispute over constitu
tional meaning and method. The meaning of the Constitution is
fiercely contested and includes such fundamental matters as: whether
the fourteenth amendment incorporates the Bill of Rights and makes
it applicable to the states; whether the free speech clause of the first
amendment protects only political speech; whether the Constitution
protects individual privacy, and if it does, what interests are protected
by this concept; whether church and state can be meaningfully entan
gled without violating the establishment clause of the first amend
ment; how much process the Constitution requires each state to afford
a defendant in a criminal proceeding; and where the boundaries are
• Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University. I wish to
thank David Carlson and Chuck Vablon for their helpful comments, and Gary Holtzer, a
Cardozo student, for his outstanding assistance in preparing the text and notes for publication.
1 The most obvious and important evidence of this revival in theory in the last twenty
years is the law and society, law and economics, and critical legal studies movements. In
addition to these currents of thought, there have been recent theoretical developments in con
stitutional law, and in law and the feminist perspective.
2 10 Cardozo L. Rev. 3 (1988) [hereinafter Brennan].
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established by such elusive concepts as federalism and separation of
powers.
Constitutional commentators also disagree over the proper inter
pretative theory for construing the Constitution. Their differences are
substantial and include: whether the interpreter should construe the
Constitution literally and in accord with the intent of the constitu
tional framers; whether the Constitution should be interpreted to rein
force the democratic process, even though such a meaning is not
required by the text and was not intended by the framers; and
whether the Constitution should be viewed as a living document
which should be interpreted to meet the needs of a given era.^
Brennan's paper is related to a second theoretical dispute involv
ing modem political liberalism and its legal analogue."* The 1950's
witnessed a growing acceptance by intellectuals of modem American
liberalism, as it had evolved in the wake of FDR's New Deal and
World War II, and its legal theory counterpart. Seymour Lipset cap
tured the scope of poUtical consensus when he wrote in a chapter enti
tled "The End of Ideology?" that "[t]he democratic class stmggle will
continue, but it will be a fight without ideologies, without red flags,
without May Day parades.'" Lipset continued:
This change in Western political life reflects the fact that the
fundamental political problems of the industrial revolution have
been solved: the workers have achieved industrial and political citi
zenship; the conservatives have accepted the welfare state; and the
democratic left has recognized that an increase in over-all state
power carries with it more dangers to freedom than solutions for
economic problems.'
The political consensus identified by Lipset rested on three as
sumptions. Our economy was considered sufficiently elastic that the
distributive justice requirements of the good society could be satisfied
without radical or stmctural changes.' Our federalism, which divided
3 See, e.g.. Construing the Constitution, 19 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1, 1-30 (1985) (reprinting
addresses by W. Brennan, J. Stevens, and E. Meese).
* J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971), is the dominant, recent text on liberalism that is
central to the contempory debate over liberalism. R. Dworkin's two books, Taking Rights
Seriously (1977) and Law's Empire (1986), and B. Ackerman's Social Justice in the Liberal
State (1980), are some of the major expressions of liberal legal theory.
3 S. Lipset, Political Man: The Social Basis of Politics 445 (1963).
6 Id. at 442-43.
' The highly praised legal text by H. Hart and A. Sacks, The Legal Process; Basic
Problems in the Making and Application of Law III (tentative ed. 1958), expresses this as
sumption as the "fallacy of the static pie." Hart and Sacks wrote:
At bottom, [many people] have argued, the social problem is a problem simply of
deciding who gets what. This view starts with the obvious fact that there is not
enough in the world of all the things that people want to go around among the
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power among different layers of government, protected our demo
cratic processes and freedoms against creeping totalitarianism.® The
United States' military power was judged sufficient to protect it from
external and internal threats.'
These assumptions were shaken by our national experiences in
the sixties and early seventies. The collapse and dissipation of the
civil rights movement and the war on poverty ended optimistic hopes
that social, racial, and economic justice were within a generation's
reach. The traumatic experience of our military involvement in Viet
nam shattered our sense of security, and graphically illustrated the
limits of American military power. The OPEC oil cartel dealt a seri
ous blow to American illusions of economic independence, and em
phasized international economic interdependence. The emergence of
detente implied America's formal acceptance of the end of a national
quest for military superiority over the Soviet Union. Further, the en
largement of national power in Washington sparked sharp criticism of
the national government from the political left and right which in
turn enhanced sensitivities to the risks posed by centralized power to
democratic processes and freedoms.
These experiences fundamentally altered our collective outlook.
Optimism about our elastic economy was replaced by doubt and no
tions of the zero-sum and the lean years.'® The idea of the American
Century faded into fears that American power was waning. Hope for
social, economic, and racial justice turned into pessimism, sparked by
assertions that inequalities and unfairness were inevitable, and weak
assurances that a "safety net" existed for the poorest.
The disintegration of national optimism and a sense of security
prompted formidable challenges to basic tenets of modem political
people who want them. The gist of the social situation is then seen, baldly, as no
more than a continuing struggle among conflicting claimants to get what they can.
In this view, the whole apparatus of social order, law included, becomes little more
than a substitute or a mask for force, providing a cover of legitimacy for the deci
sions that have to be made among the various contestants.
These materials proceed upon the conviction that this is a fallacy—"the fal
lacy of the static pie."
The fact—the entirely objective fact—seems to be that the pie—that is, the
total of actually and potentially available satisfactions of human wants—is not
static but dynamic. How to make the pie larger, not how to divide the existing pie,
is the crux of the long-range and primarily significant problem.
Id. at 111.
® Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism; The Role of the States in the Compo
sition and Selection of the National Government, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 543, 543 (1954).
9 2 S. Ambrose, Eisenhower; The President 625-27 (1984).
'0 See L. Thurow, The Zero-Sum Society (1980); R. Bamet, The Lean Years; Politics in
the Age of Society (1980).
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liberalism. The power of the modem state was criticized as threaten
ing to economic efficiency, democratic processes, and individual free
doms. Emphasis on individual rights was attacked as misplaced
because it undercut community values and cohesiveness, or deni
grated because it inadequately protected the individual from intrusive
state regulation. The concept of human dignity was assailed as defi
cient unless it was accompanied by a fair measure of distributive jus
tice, Although the intellectual roots for the current critique of
modem liberalism may be found in every decade of the century, the
post-sixties challenges posed by communitarians and libertarians have
force and intensity absent for some time.
Brennan's Reason, Passion and "The Progress of the Law"^^ is
related to these two intellectual landscapes. On the one hand, his pa
per is obviously written with the contemporary constitutional debate
in mind even though he does not mention it.'^ He boldly presents a
sweeping vision of the role of "reason" and "passion" in constitu
tional interpretation, and relates his vision to what he considers one of
the most serious social and political problems in modem America—
the intmsiveness of the expanding state into the lives of its citizens,
and the paramount importance of stmcturing that relationship so as
to foster individual dignity. On the other hand, although Brennan
may have written his paper without having the current dialogue over
modem liberalism in mind, at least two of its dominant themes are
controversial predicaments of modem political and legal liberalism.
Defining these predicaments not only helps place Brennan's views on
constitutional law in a broader context, but also illuminates and ex
plains the problematic aspects of Brennan's eloquently stated and
forcefully presented constitutional arguments.
I. A SUMMARY OF BRENNAN'S VIEWS
Brennan's thesis is that the intemal dialogue of "reason" and
"passion" within a judge is vital to the judicial process. He asserts
that the judicial process goes haywire, as it did during the Lochner"
era when judges denied that they made value choices in deciding a
case. Judges and the judicial process are strengthened and invigo
rated when judges permit their intuition and passion to guide them in
discharging their responsibility.
In explicating his thesis, Brennan attacks the conception of adju
dication that portrays the judge as "no more than a legal pharmacist.
< > Brennan, supra note 2.
>2 Id. at 4.
>3 Lochner v. New York, 198

U.S. 45 (1905).
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dispensing the correct rule prescribed for the legal problem
presented.'"'* According to this view, which he labels formalism,
"judges decided cases in mechanical, 'scientific' fashion"*' by apply
ing precedent, "and where precedent supplied no obvious answer,
they simply 'discovered' the appropriate rule, dormant and imbedded
in the ineluctable logic of the law.'"®
Brennan begins his argument with an historical analysis. He ar
gues that a "myth," which he states might be called the "judge-asoracle" myth," arose in the nineteenth century as a response to the
judicial branch's birth "in the trenches of partisan politics.'"* He
claims that this myth was "at first entirely healthy'"' as a counterbal
ance "to the spectre of politicization that hung over the Court in its
early years."^° But he argues that the long term effect was to distance
the judge from the qualities other than reason that Brennan considers
essential "to a healthy and vital rationality."^*
Brennan explains that during the early years of the republic,
there was an intense debate over the power that federal judges exer
cised, and a deep suspicion about who should be a judge. The judici
ary quickly understood that it had to "tether its decisions to
constitutional principles and not party affiliation,"^^ or at least strug
gle to imbue the popular and legal culture with that notion. Brennan
claims that several factors combined over many decades to strengthen
this myth of judge-as-oracle. The "great opinions of the Marshall
Court,"^' the publication of Supreme Court decisions by William
Cranch, and "[t]he rise of the legal treatise, with its strangely disem
bodied character,"^"* along with other factors all contributed to the
idea of judges as legal robots crunching out the inevitable decision
that was buried in the mysterious legal texts and traditions that only
the legally trained could fathom.
Brennan argues that although the development of this judge-asoracle myth was understandable, it embodied a grave threat to the
legitimacy of the federal judiciary than did the judiciary's politicaliza>5
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
22
24

Brennan, supra note 2, at 4.
Id,
Id.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 7.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 7.
Id.
Id. at 8.
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tion which promoted the myth in the first place. He contends that
judges eventually persuaded themselves that formalism was not a
myth but a realistic description of how they actually decided cases.
Brennan asserts that this approach deprived the judiciary of the
"nourishment"" it would otherwise have obtained from other quali
ties that were vital to the judicial process. He refers to these other
qualities as "passion," which he in turn defines as a "range of emo
tional and intuitive responses to a given set of facts or arguments ...
which often speed into our consciousness far ahead of the lumbering
syllogisms of reason."^'
Brennan illustrates his point that formalism posed more of a
threat to the judiciary's legitimacy than politicalization by discussing
the Supreme Court's decision in Lochner v. New York?^ In Lochner,
the Court invalidated a New York statute that limited the number of
hours per week bakery employees could work, because it constituted a
deprivation of liberty without due process of law guaranteed by the
fourteenth amendment. Brennan argues that "[t]he problem with the
decision was not that it lacked rationality."" He concedes that the
opinion was logical given the majority's underlying premise. The
problem, he contends, lay with the majority's underlying premise.
Brennan asserts that the Lochner majority used as a primary premise
a concept of " 'negative liberty,'
which Brennan defines "as free
dom from restraint,"^' and which otherwise might be understood as
laissez-faire. Brennan concludes that this premise "was rooted in 'a
philosophy that had served its day,' but was ill-suited for modem
problems."^^
Brennan argues that the Lochner majority's absorption of for
malism as a way of thinking caused it to select negative liberty as the
starting point to decide the constitutionality of the New York statute.
By aspiring to the perfection of pure reason, and faithful adherence to
precedent as the majority perceived it, the Lochner majority had cut
themselves off from "sources of inspiration that would have enriched
their rational debate.
Brennan asserts that if the Lochner justices
had approached the facts in the case not only with a sense of "reason"
25
26
27
28
29
20
2'
22
22

Id. at 9.
Id.
Id.
198 U.S. 45 (1905).
Brennan, supra note 2, at 10.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting B. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 78 (1921)).
Id. at 11.
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but "passion," they would have "easily arrived at"^'* the concept of
positive liberty—^the freedom that results when the state uses its
power to adjust relations to promote equality in contract. Brennan is
confident that if the majority had employed his concept of positive
liberty, it would have focused on "the plight of an employee whose
only 'choice' is between working the hours the employer demands or
not working at all."^' Brennan is convinced that such a choice would
have struck the Lochner majority as it "strikes us, intuitively, as no
choice at all,"^* thus persuading it to overthrow the restraints of for
malism and to sustain the New York statute.
Brennan clearly believes that formalism led to Lochner and the
era it symbolizes, which is widely considered by students of American
constitutional law as one of the low points in constitutional jurispru
dence. The result was that the Court eventually found itself in the
middle of a political storm as it invalidated several state and federal
statutes it considered violative of laissez-faire values. This history
constitutes Brennan's evidence for the claim that the cure of formal
ism gave rise to a more treacherous disease than that which it was
meant to treat.
Offering a sweeping interpretation of American constitutional
law during the republic's first one hundred and fifty years, Brennan
seeks to illustrate how "the progress of the law depends on a dialogue
between heart and head,'"' by focusing on the due process clause.
Brennan claims that the due process clause, "[pjerhaps more than any
other provision of the Constitution . . . requires reliance on both rea
son and passion for its interpretation.'"*
Brennan roots his construction of the due process clause in the
framers' theory of government, which he states "represented a sharp
break with the past and its assumptions of a natural social hierar
chy."*' The framers understood "government as a contract 'formed
by the individuals of the society with each other, instead of a mutual
arrangement between rulers and ruled.'
"Under such a theory of
government,'"*' Brennan argued, "due process required fidelity to . . .
the essential dignity and worth of each individual.'"** Brennan
Id.
35 Id.
36 Id.
3' Id. at 12.
38 Id. at 13.
39 Id. at 15.
90 Id. (quoting G. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787, at 601
(1969)) (emphasis in original).
9' Id.
92 Id.
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continued:
Since those who ruled possessed no inherent superiority over those
they ruled, the requirements of due process now applied to all offi
cials, commanding them to treat citizens not as subjects but as fel
low human beings. In short, due process requires that the rulers
and the ruled acknowledge their common humanity, and that offi
cial judgment always remain human judgment.*^
Brennan contends that if the purposes of the due process clause
are to be achieved, judges responsible for interpreting and applying it
must be "sensitive to the balance of reason and passion that mark a
given age, and the ways in which that balance leaves its mark on the
everyday exchanges between government and citizen.'"*^ We must, he
insists, "draw on our own experience as inhabitants of that age, and
our own sense of the uneven fabric of social life."^' Failure to adhere
to this admonition will constitute a serious loss to individual dignity
since "the greatest threat to due process principles is formal reason
severed from the insights of passion."**
Brennan believes that we must quickly use the due process clause
to protect individual dignity, because government power has in
creased to a point where government officials now " 'make decisions
that affect us from before the cradle to beyond the grave.'
Now
more than ever procedural protections are required to guard individ
ual dignity threatened by the bureaucratic state.
Brennan concludes his paper with an illustration of how due pro
cess jurisprudence takes account of concepts as abstract as reason and
passion. His focus is on Goldberg v. Kelly which he describes as
"the opening shot in a modem 'due process revolution.'
In
Goldberg, the Court concluded that the state was required by the due
process clause to hold a hearing to determine eligibility, before termi
nating a welfare recipient's benefits. Brennan argues that the
pretermination hearing resulted from "injecting passion into a system
whose abstract rationality had led it astray."*® Inserting passion into
the adjudicatory process prompted the Justices to focus on a recipi
ent's "intricate texture of daily life"*' and to appreciate "the drastic
Id. (emphasis in original).
^ Id. at 16.
-•5 Id.
Id. at 17.
Id. at 17-18 (quoting J.Mashaw, Due Process in the Administrative State 12 (1985))
(emphasis in original).
-•8 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
Brennan, supra note 2, at 19 (quoting J. Mashaw, supra note 47, at 33).
so Id. at 20.
s« Id. at 22.
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consequences of terminating a recipient's only means of subsis
tence.'"^ Brennan concluded that "[a] government insensitive to such
a reality cannot be said to treat individuals with the respect that due
process demands—not because its oflScials do not reason, but because
they cannot understand.'"^
Brennan concedes that the Goldberg decision "may have
spawned unforeseen consequences"" by contributing "in some ways
to the formality of the welfare system."" But he believes that it did
more good than harm by opening "a dialogue that continues to this
day about the responsibilities of the bureaucratic state to its citi
zens.'"® This dialogue will not produce static due process principles,
for "[e]ach age must seek its own way to the unstable balance of those
qualities that make us human."®' Brennan claims that this inquiry
into understanding "the pulse of life beneath the official version of
events"®® will only be meaningful if we "do not take refuge in the
illusion of rational certainty"®' or insist on allowing our passion to
influence our judgment.
II. BRENNAN AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
The constitutional debates over meaning and method are related.
The interpreter's approach to the Constitution may determine its
meaning, and the meaning desired by the interpreter may influence
the interpreter's choice of interpretive theory. But as closely tied as
these two debates are, they are fundamentally different.
For reasons I speculate about later, Brennan's paper conflates
these two distinct debates. He portrays his disagreement with the
Lochner majority as addressing interpretive method, when he actually
disagrees with their understanding of constitutional meaning. He
characterizes his concept of passion as if it were an interpretive meth
odology, when it is substantive. He claims that the Supreme Court's
legitimacy is most threatened by the meaning it ascribes to the Consti
tution, but he employs arguments that indicate his belief that the
Court's legitimacy is dependent on both meaning and method.
Id. at 20.
" Id. at 22.
^ Id.
" Id.
Id.
" Id.
58 Id.
59 Id.
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A. "Reason" Is Not Method

Breiman imbues his concept of reason with two distinct mean
ings. First, he uses it to describe how the legal and popular cultures
conceived of the judicial decisionmaking process. These cultures con
ceived of the reasoning process as a method employed by a judge to
apply determinate law to determinate facts to reach a decision that
was objectively correct. In this sense, formalism and the judicial use
of reasoning are a misleading image of the judicial process. Judges
fostered this image over decades to shield the federal judiciary from
the charges of politicalization that threatened the courts during the
early years following the organization of our republic.
But Brennan uses the word "reason" in a distinctly second but
far more important sense. He argues that formalism and the concept
of reason eventually became more than merely misleading advertising
intended to calm the fears about the abuse of judicial process: it be
came an accurate description of it. Brennan's use of reason in this
sense is most evident in his discussion of Lochner. He claims that if
the Lochner judges had not become formalist in fact, they would have
decided the case differently, because their intuitive responses—^their
passion—^would have put them in touch with what he labels positive
liberty. Brennan believes that if the Lochner majority had us^ posi
tive liberty as the basis from which to decide the case, it would have
reasoned its way to a result upholding a statute designed to overcome
the inequality in bargaining power between workers and employers.
Brennan portrays his criticism of the Lochner majority as a disa
greement over method. He cannot believe that judges influenced by
passion could reach the result of the Lochner majority. He believes
that a judge who accepted a dialogue between his intuition and ration
ality as a basis for deciding a case would uphold the New York law
limiting the number of hours bakery employees could be required to
work.
Brennan may be correct, but he need not be. The Lochner ma
jority's decision might well have reflected its intuition and the com
mon values of the time. The Lochner majority may have been
influenced by laissez-faire values and viewed government interference
in the market place as presumptively dangerous. It may have believed \
that laissez-faire values shoidd prevail even when the choice con- ;
fronting workers was to work on the employers' terms or not to work
at all. The fact that the majority opinion was written in accord with
what Brennan considers to be the requirements of formalism, may
only have been to assure that the decision conformed to what the ma
jority considered to be the accepted and expected forms of judicial '
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opinion writing. In short, Brennan's disbelief may not be wellfounded; the Lochner majority may have been in touch with "pas
sion" and strong community sentiment, but its passion may have been
for values different from his.
B. "Passion" Is Meaning
Brennan defines passion as "the range of emotional and intuitive
responses to a given set of facts or arguments, responses which often
speed into our consciousness far ahead of the lumbering syllogisms of
reason."*" He considers passion to be "nourishment essential to a
healthy and vital rationality"*' and believes that it is "not only an
inevitable but a desirable part of the judicial process, an aspect more
to be nurtured than fear^."*^ Brennan distinguishes passion from
"impassioned judgment,"*' which he describes as judgment which has
surrendered to the "tug of such sentiments."**
Brennan portrays his concept of passion, similar to his view of
reason, as if it were an interpretive methodology that was value-free,
leading a judge to the correct primary premise from which to reason.
He argues that if the Lochner majority had permitted itself to be
guided by its passion, it would have sustained the New York statute
protecting bakers. Brennan also contends that passion caused the
Goldberg majority to perceive that a pretermination hearing was nec
essary for welfare recipients who were totally dependent on their pub
lic benefits.
Although Brennan does not define passion as normative, that is
the meaning he gives it In Lochner, he does not entertain the possi
bility that a judge's intuitive response could cause him to oppose state
intervention in the marketplace, even at the cost of the bakers' health,
because of classic libertarian fears of state power. In Goldberg, he
rejects the possibility that a judge's intuition might influence him to
oppose the imposition of a prior hearing out of fear that it will con
tribute "to the formality of die welfare system,"*' which tends "to
banish passion from government altogether, and to establish a state
where only reason will reign."** If Brennan's concept of passion was
merely methodological, a judge in Lochner or Goldberg should have
been able to follow his passion to a decision not countenanced by
«> Id. at 9.
Id.
« Id. at 10.
" Id. at 11.
6* Id.
Id. at 22.
66 Id. at 18.
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Brennan, without being vulnerable to Brennan's criticism that he had
severed his internal decisionmaking process from his intuition and
passion. Brennan's refusal to permit this possibility establishes the
substantive nature of his concept of passion.
C. Legitimacy, Method, and Meaning
Alexander Bickel,®' Robert Bork,®® and other conservative schol
ars are largely responsible for allowing the anti-majoritarian critique
of the Supreme Court to become a central axis of contemporary con
stitutional law commentary. Indeed, for some it is the only axis for
any defensible "grand theory" of constitutional law.*® According to
this perspective, the Supreme Court should declare majoritarian pref
erences unconstitutional primarily when they conflict with the plain
meaning of the Constitution and the framers' intent.
Brennan does not endorse this conservative critique of the
Supreme Court. Nor doM he embrace the Umitations this critique
places on constitutional interpretations. Yet Brennan is alert to the
conservative assessment of the Supreme Court, and he is worried
about the capacity of the Court to maintain itself as a respected and
influential co-equal branch of government.
Brennan's paper reveals his alertness to the conservative critique
in two ways. First, as already discussed, Brennan conflate the
method and meaning debate in constitutional law. The reason may be
that he believes he can make more persuasive arguments on behalf of
his interpretive methodology than on behalf of the constitutional re
sults he desires. He hopes to persuade us that his method is valuefree, even though it leads only to r«ults he supports.
Second, Brennan argues that the Lochner era teaches that the
main threat to the Court's power was and is substantive results that
the other co-equal branches of government and the public will not
honor. He believes that the Justices increase the risk that the Court's
decisions will be unacceptable when they isolate themselves from their
p^sion in deciding cases. He insists that a judge's personal views
cannot be kept out of the decisionmaking process, and that it is a
serious mistake to pretend that they can be. He asserts that decisions
do not and should not solely reflect the text of the Constitution or the
67 See, e.g., A. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of
Politics (1962).
68 Se^ e.g., R. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 Ind.
LJ. 1 (1971).
6* S«, e.g., J. Ely, Democracy and Distrust (1979) (the term "grand theory" is drawn from
The Return of Grand Theory in the Htunan Sdences 1 (Q. Skinner ed. 1985)),
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intent of the framers; they do and should reflect the vision of the
judge.
Despite the force of his presentation, Brennan appears to lack
some confidence in his claim that the Court's legitimacy rests primar
ily on the acceptability of its substantive results. Brennan argues that
the decision in Goldberg and the result he wishes the Court had
reached in Lochner were not only correct, but also reflect the original
intent of the framers. He explains that the framers intended the Con
stitution to constitute a covenant among the citizens, not between the
rulers and the ruled. He asserts that this means that the framers in
tended that the government must always respect the individuality and
dignity of its citizens. Brennan us^ this premise to claim that the
imposition of the pretermination hearing in Goldberg was simply a
fulflUment of the framers' intent, as would have been a decision to
sustain the New York statute in Lochner.
Brennan attempts to tilt in two directions at once. When discuss
ing interpretive approaches to the Constitution, he emphasizes the reaUst perception that a judge's personal views play a significant role in
construing the Constitution and deciding cases. But when he dis
cusses constitutional meaning, he develops an elaborate argument,
grounding his interpretation in the framers' intent
Identifying these two contrary leanings is easier than reconciling
them. Nevertheless, an explanation emerges from Brennan's piece.
Brennan recognizes that the Court's legitimacy depends on public ac
ceptance of its decisions, and that acceptance dq)ends in large part on
the acceptability of the substantive result. But he believes that accept
ance partially requires that a decision not be viewed solely as the re
sult of a justice's personal preference. Judges should ground their
da;isions in the constitutional text, the framers' intent, and constitu
tional history.
Brennan's ambivalence is understandable. The interplay between
outcome and methodology, and their relationship to the Court's legit
imacy—^its capacity to maintain its status as a third co-equal branch
of government—^is subtle and complex. Outcomes must be accepta
ble, and part of what makes them acceptable is the acceptability of the
methodology employed by the interpreter. Methodology alone may
steer the Court in disastrous directions, as it did the Lochner Court,
but outcomes unsupported by an acceptable methodology may make
the Court's decision suspect. Thus, Brennan has a strong view of
what the proper outcome should be in Lochner and Goldberg, and at
the same time feels compelled to tie the outcome—^no matter how
loosely—^to the intent of the framers.
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III. BRENNAN AND MODERN LIBERALISM
Brennan adheres to major tenets of modem liberalism in Ws
paper. He emphasizes the importance of individual dignity, the signifi
cant role of the modem state in creating and maintaining the good
society, and the importance of shaping the relationship between the
modem welfare state and the individual so that the state's powers are
not impmdently diminished, and individual dignity is preserved. By
so doing, however, Brennan encounters two important dilemmas
of modem liberalism, partially accounting for his effort to camouflage
his preferred constitutional interpretations as interpretive metho
dology.
Central to Brennan's views is the importance he places on "the
dignity and worth of each individual."™ He easily persuades
the reader that his support for what has come to be called the rightsmodel approach to constitutional interpretation is obviously a direct
consequence of this position. Although he does not refer to modem
political philosophers, he would seem to agree with John Rawls that
"[e]ach person possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even
the welfare of society as a whole cannot override .... [T]he rights
secured by justice are not subject to political bargaining or to the
calculus of social interests."'*
Nevertheless, Brennan does not explain what he means by the
^yntial dignity and worth of each individual. We know from his
analysis of Lochner (as well as all his other writings) that he is not a
libertarian (or a devotee of law and economics) wedded to a market
economy and a strict regime of private property rights. But Brennan
does not state that individual dignity and self-worth require the state
to assure to each individual minimal necessities such as food, cloth
ing, housing, and medical care, or a fair measure of distributive
justice.
Brennan's failure to explain a vital concept such as individual
dignity is endemic to modem liberalism, which is tom between two
conflicting and pivotal values, liberty and wjuality. The liberty value,
Robert Nozick has argued, leads to a mininuil state that is "scmpulously... neutral between its citizens.'"^ The equality value supports
an activist state using its powers to promote the equality of opportu
nity and distributive justice. The tension between these two values is
a source of dispute among political thwrists, and limits the ability of
™ BFcnnan, sui»m note 2, at 15.
't J. Rawte, A Theory of Justice 3^4 (1971).
72 R. Norick, Anarehy, State, and Utopia 33 (1974) (emphasis in twiginai).
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constitutional jurists, like Brennan, to fashion a conception of an indi
vidual's constitutional right that is broadly accepted.
Brennan grapples with a second problem of modem liberalism.
Modem liberalism conceives of the state as a positive and creative
force "Ring its vast powers to nurture the good society. It also places
great emphasis on the individual as an entity the state must respect.
As the modem liberal state seeks to create the good society ^d be
comes more entangled with the lives of its citizens, the relationship
between the state and its citizens must be structured so that the state
can fulfill its responsibilities without threatening individual dignity.
Brennan's paper echoes this dilemma. He emphasizes the fact
that the state has not only become bigger, but more intrusive in the
lives of each citizen. As he explains:
In the two hundred years since our Constitution was framed, gov
ernment has vastly increased in the size and scope of its activities.
As one observer puts it, in contemporary society "[i]t is not only
trite, it is no longer sufficient to say that we have a cradle-to-grave
administrative, welfare state. Administrators make decisions that
affect us from before the cradle to beyond the grave.""
Brennan accepts this development not only as a matter of constitu
tional law, but also as an inevitable consequence of the modem wel
fare state he supports.
Breiman argues, however, that the state must respect individual
dignity as it discharges its responsibilities. The state's bxireaucracy
must possess sufficient discretion to allow it to be compassionate to
individuals, but not so much discretion to permit it to be arbitrary.
Apart from claiming that procedural due process may provide a basis
for reconciling these opposing pulls, Brennan does not make any pro
gress in resolving this predicament.
Brennan's dilemmas are fundamental to his philosophical and
constitutional outlook. His inability to dissipate them limits the influ
ence of his thought. Yet his wealmesses are no more (or less) than
those of modem liberalism which he ardently supports. And while we
may be tempted to fault Brennan and modem liberalism for not
resolving these theoretical difficulties, it may be a serious error to ex
pect modem liberalism to resolve these prechcaments for they embody
important and complex values that all significant western political
theories find difficult to accommodate.
'3 Brennan, supra note 2, at 17-18 (quoting J. Mashaw, supra note 47, at 12); see R. Higgs,
Crisis and Leviathan; Critical Episodes in the Growth of American Government chs. 1, 10-11
(1987); T. Lowi, The End of Liberalism; The Second Republic of the United States pts. 3-4 (2d
ed. 1979).
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CONCLUDING COMMENTS
Justice Brennan's thought is worthy of our attention for at least
two reasons. Brennan's influence on American life during the thirtytwo years he has been on the Court has been substantial. Indeed, it
would be difficult to exaggerate the impact he has had on our nation
as an intellect, a welder of majorities for seminal opinions which he
has crafted, and a passionate dissenter protesting the dilution or de
struction of values he labored so hard to protect.
But Brennan is not only powerful; he is wise and humane. Isaiah
Berlin once observed that at any given moment a society holds dear a
plurality of conflicting values that may be impossible to reconcile:
"The world that we encounter in ordinary experience is one in which
we are faced with choices between ends equally ultimate, and claims
equally absolute, the realization of some of which must inevitably in
volve the sacrifice of others."'* For all the fierceness with which he
advocates his views, Brennan is aware that his vision is only one of
many. Yet he resists the paralysis of relativism, and accepts "[t]he
necessity of choosing between absolute claims . .. [as] an inescapable
characteristic of die human condition."'®
For more than three decade Brennan has been a model of cour
age, force, and eloquence in making his judgments and in helping us
make our societal ones. As a judge, he has struggled to be sensitive to
the poor, needy, and vulnerable. As a constitutional jurist, he has
tried to remain loyal to the traditions of his Court while seeking to
accommodate his constitutional interpretations with his larger social
and political vision. His Reason. Passion, and "The Progress of the
Law" expresses his moral and intellectual struggles as a judge and
constitutional jurist, and constitutes one of his many valuable contri
butions that help to illuminate our choices and to shape our decisions.
Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, Four Essays on liberty 168 (1984).
75 Id. at 169.

